Preliminary Statement of Organization and Arrangements Required to Meet Essential Intelligence Needs of USIA

The Needs.

The identified intelligence needs of USIA (Tab A) are substantially the same (through perhaps varying in detail) as those of OCB, DDP/CIA and the P Area in State and may be found to be substantially the same as those of the military services (military are being tested by the attached, Tab B).

The Intelligence Community

1. The regular production of OIR/State has included a number of the intelligence materials needed. More and in some cases more detailed studies are needed. In addition, new approaches to collation and analysis and forms of presentation of materials are required. Such increased production and adaptation is contingent upon:

    a. Increased manpower to permit time for understanding and flexibility to meet USIA (as well as OCB, DDP) needs without detriment to legitimate Departmental and National Estimating, NIS, demands;

    b. More cooperative and joint planning between policy and operational personnel and intelligence personnel. This should be encouraged at all levels and should be as informal as possible with proper respect for channels before major commitments are made;

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c. The establishment (USIA, CCB, DDP and OIR) or strengthening of liaison personnel to facilitate communication, understanding and prompt reaction between policy and operational officials and OIR.

2. Furthermore, agreements should be worked out in respect of units of the intelligence community which have special materials not heretofore used or adequately used by USIA.

USIA

The USIA should have its own intelligence organization. It should have the following functions:

1. Prepare especially tailored intelligence reports and memoranda for USIA which, on the basis of consultation, cannot be produced by OIR/State or elsewhere in the intelligence community.

2. Screen intelligence materials for utilization in USIA output.

3. Phrase and levy collection requirements.

4. Provide such intelligence library and reference facilities as are necessary for USIA operation and as cannot be met by utilization of existing facilities of other intelligence agencies and in particular of CIA.

5. Review those scripts or materials for USIA output when necessary to check for accuracy based on intelligence information

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or where an intelligence expert might be able to add material not already included.

6. Screen external research materials for their relevance to USIA components.

7. Screen USIA-sponsored external research contracts, products, and USIA operation materials (memoranda, reports, dispatches and cables and debriefings) in order to identify material of interest to the intelligence community.

8. Serve as a control point for dissemination, use and declassification requests for intelligence materials.